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ADVERTISING THE ECONOMICS OF HIGH JURY
AWARDS: THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY'S BID FOR
PROSPECTIVE JURORS TO TIGHTEN THEIR PURSE
STRINGS
"Advertise or go under."
-Dorothy Sayers, Murder Must Advertise
The triumphant return of a large money judgment for a personal in-
jury plaintiff is at best a Pyrrhic victory for the jury. Large personal in-.
jury awards have contributed to the dramatic rise of insurance costs to
the consumer.1 Juries increasingly view tort defendants and their insurers
capable of paying generous financial compensation in personal injury ac-
tions.2 While jurors may reap a certain degree of satisfaction at the time
of litigation from "making the wrongdoer pay,"s the jury, as a representa-
tive group of insurance policy holders and consumers, ultimately bears
the cost of exorbitant verdicts.4 This economic reality has become the
subject of a recent insurance industry advertising campaign designed to
reduce runaway jury awards.5
The insurance industry's advertising campaign criticizes the present
tort recovery system and urges immediate reform.6 By depicting a direct
I Soaring insurance premiums, far beyond upward adjustments for inflation, can be
partially attributed to the frequency of high jury awards. See Why Everybody Is Suing,
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, December 4, 1978 at 51. [hereinafter cited as Everybody Is
Suing]. The growing rush to litigate increases the costs, resulting from legal services and
insurance, of most products and services purchased today. The success of personal injury
plaintiffs in receiving high damage awards costs government, business, labor and other insti-
tutions billions of dollars in both preventing and litigating lawsuits. Id. In 1971, juries in the
United States gave out 11 damage awards of one million dollars or more, while in 1977, 56
verdicts of more than one million dollars were granted. Id. at 53. A sampling of the de-
scribed jury awards reveals a high frequency of personal injury cases. ($128,466,280-auto
gas-tank explosion; $21,766,000-plane crash; $13,355,000-rape and wrongful death;
$9,341,683-seat-belt failure; $7,000,000-medical malpractice; $7,000,000-swimming-pool acci-
dent; $5,565,700-job accident; $5,200,000-football accident). Id.
2 See FoRBs, April 3, 1978, at 79. In describing its recovery from several years of profit
losses, Aetna Life & Casualty Company explained that it had adjusted insurance premiums
upward to account for what it described as "social inflation." Id. Juries had been making
bigger damage awards, thinking "they were taking money from corporate fat cats to give to
some poor unfortunate." Id. In reality, however, the insurance companies pass the cost of
high jury awards back to the policy holders in the form of increased premiums. Id.
3 See Everybody Is Suing, supra note 1, at 50.
Id. at 50-53.
5 See generally Busmzss WEEK, July 31, 1978, at 39; Insurance Company Ads Draw
Trial-Lawyer Fire, 64 A.B.A.J. 531 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Insurance Company Ads].
6 After presenting its case that juries are granting windfall awards to undeserving plain-
tiffs, an Aetna advertisement asks the question "What can we do?" See Aetna Life & Casu-
alty Company advertisement, reprinted in Insurance Company Ads, supra note 5, at 531.
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correlation between high jury awards and rising insurance premiums,7 the
advertisements attempt to discredit the popular Robin Hood concept of
rewarding personal injury plaintiffs from the pockets of "wealthy" insur-
ance companies as an economically dangerous practice.8 Understandably,
the insurance industry's advertising campaign has drawn considerable at-
tention from personal injury lawyers.9
Challenges to insurance company advertising require courts to balance
the competing constitutional considerations of the civil litigant's right to
a fair trial and the insurance company's right to free speech. Courts must
determine the scope of the fair trial right and whether it must be held in
balance with a fully protected first amendment right to free speech or
perhaps a lesser, qualified privilege. Thus the balancing act begins with
an examination of the right to a fair trial.
The seventh amendment of the United-States Constitution guarantees
the right of trial by jury to civil litigants.10 While this amendment is not
In response, the advertisement suggests that liability should not be assessed where there
was no fault, juries should take into account a victim's own responsibility for his losses, and
awards should realistically reflect only the actual loss suffered. A St. Paul Property & Lia-
bility Insurance advertisement criticizes the trend toward excessive jury awards and asks
the public to write a letter to its legislators and be heard. See St. Paul Property & Liability
Insurance advertisement, reprinted in Loftus, Insurance Advertising and Jury Awards, 65
A.B.A.J. 68, 70 (1978)[hereinafter cited as Loftus] (sample ads); text accompanying note 7
infra.
' See Insurance Company Ads, supra note 5, at 531, and Loftus, supra note 6, at 70.
(sample ads). Part of an Aetna advertisement reads: "When awarding damages in liability
cases, the jury is cautioned to be fair and bear in mind that money does not grow on trees. It
must be paid through insurance premiums from uninvolved parties, such as yourselves."
Insurance Company Ads, supra note 5, at 531. A St. Paul advertisement states: "'Sue thy
Neighbor' is fast becoming one of America's favorite pastimes. But who really foots the bill
on the 'big pot' some lucky claimant wins? We all do." (emphasis in original). Loftus, supra
note 6, at 70.
s See Insurance Company Ads, supra note 5, at 531, and Loftus, supra note 6, at 70.
(sample ads). An Aetna advertisement urges that it is time to look hard at what windfall
awards are costing. In a footnote, Aetna explains that not only are insurance premiums
being driven up by high jury awards, but the skyrocketing insurance premiums of manufac-
turers, doctors, hospitals and other targets of high jury awards are causing higher prices for
all goods and services. Insurance Company Ads, supra note 5, at 531. A St. Paul advertise-
ment explains that insurance is a system of sharing risk among many, and that excessive
jury awards cause everyone to pay more. Loftus, supra note 6, at 70.
1 See BusiNF s WanK, July 31, 1978, at 39. Plaintiffs' lawyers have filed actions with
the insurance commissions of Connecticut, Nevada and Kansas, and instituted court cases
in New York and Connecticut, claiming that Aetna's advertising campaign is deceptive and
is a form of jury tampering. Id. See also Insurance Company Ads, supra note 5. Several
complaints to the Federal Trade Commission have also been made. See also text accompa-
nying notes 56-59 infra. Plaintiffs' lawyers in Connecticut and Kansas have succeeded in
having both Crum & Forster, another insurance company, and Aetna sign consent orders
with their respective state insurance commissions agreeing not to publish the advertise-
ments. See Kronzer, Jury Tampering-1978 Style, 10 ST. MARY's L. J. 399, 400 n.9
(1979)[hereinafter cited as Kronzer].
10 U.S. CONST. amend. VII provides, in pertinent part, that "In suits at common law
... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."
[Vol. XXXVII
ADVERTISING AND JURY AWARDS
directly applicable to the states,", state constitutions include similar or
identical provisions.12 Unlike a criminal defendant's sixth amendment
right to be tried by an impartial jury,13 however, neither the seventh
amendment nor its state constitution counterparts contain similar "fair-
ness" language.
14
Rather than a seventh amendment guarantee, the right to a fair civil
trial is a basic requirement of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.15 Since no person shall be deprived of property without due
process of law,16 civil litigants seeking property must prove their claims
through a fair evidentiary trial process.17 Where comment about pending
litigation may seriously threaten the integrity of the judicial process,
courts have held that the right to a fair trial takes precedence.18 Relying
on the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment, the Su-
preme Court has described a fair trial as "the most fundamental of all
freedoms." 19
The due process analysis of the fair trial right is buttressed by similar
holdings made without specific reference to the due process clause. In a
'l Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875) (seventh amendment right to trial by jury
not privilege or immunity of national citizenship).
12 See, e.g., ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. H, § 7 (1928): "The right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law.. ."; MONT CONST. art. II, § 26: "The
right of trial by jury is secured to all and shall remain inviolate."; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 2:
"Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been granted by constitutional provi-
sion shall remain inviolate forever."
13 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI provides, in pertinent part, that "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury..."
14 See text accompanying notes 10 & 12 supra; Cf., LA. CONST. art. I, § 22: "All courts
shall be open, and every person shall have an adequate remedy by due process of law and
justice, administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for injury to him in
his person, property, reputation or other rights."
,5 See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). Murchison involved the propriety of a
Michigan state court judge acting as both a "one-man grand jury" and the presiding judge
in a contempt hearing. Id at 133-34. The Court identified this situation as one allowing a
biased and interested judge to preside over an otherwise objective and neutral proceeding.
Id. at 136-37. Due process, reasoned the Court, requires preventing even the possibility of
unfairness in the trial process. Id.
" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides, in pertinent part, that no State shall "deprive
any person ... of property without due process of law."
'7 See Conerly v. Flower, 410 F.2d 941, 944 (8th Cir. 1969)(court may not circumvent
due process of seventh amendment by awarding damages without evidentiary trial on
merits).
18 See, e.g., Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975). The
Bauer court interpreted the Chicago lawyers' desire to comment on pending litigation as an
irreconcilable conflict between first amendment rights and the right to a fair trial. Id. The
balance was struck in favor of the right to a fair trial, guaranteed to all persons by the due
process requirements of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
19 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965). Estes was a criminal trial involving a
conflict between the first amendment guarantee of free press and the sixth amendment
guarantee of a fair trial. Id. at 539. In discussing the fair trial right, the Court mentioned
not only the due process requirements of the fifth amendment and the provisions of the
sixth amendment, but also the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 540.
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civil case, a presumption that extraneous communications with jurors are
prejudicial may, absent rebuttal, require a new trial.20 The Supreme
Court has stated that the adjudication of controversies, both criminal and
civil, must take place in the calmness and solemnity of the courtroom,
based solely on evidence received in open court.2 1 The Court has similarly
found substantial pecuniary interest in the outcome of civil litigation in-
consistent with the adjudicative process.
2 2
The due process underpinnings of the right to a fair trial illuminate
the sensitive area encroached upon by insurance company advertising.
The message of the advertising campaign is that every potential juror has
a pecuniary interest in the outcome of a personal injury suit.2 3 Opinions
formed on the basis of insurance company advertisements could result in
verdicts based upon information received outside the evidence presented
in open court.2 4 Also, the insurance company advertisements might be re-
garded as extraneous communications with prospective jurors, raising a
presumption of prejudice.2 5 All of these considerations, however, are to be
balanced against the insurance industry's freedom of speech. Whether in-
surance advertisements advocating lower jury awards are viewed as politi-
cal, corporate or commercial speech, they are protected by the first
amendment.
As statements urging reform of the tort recovery system and as com-
mentaries on one segment of America's economy, insurance company ad-
vertisements constitute political speech. The Supreme Court consistently
has interpreted the first amendment as a fortress for the protection of
political expression. Adopting an historical approach to the first amend-
2 See Krause v. Rhodes, 570 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924 (1978).
Krause was an appeal from a suit for personal money damages on behalf of the personal
representatives of those killed at Kent State on May 4, 1970. Id. at 565. During the course
of the trial, one juror was physically assaulted and received threats on his life and the life of
his family. Id. at 568. Under these circumstances, the court held that the party seeking to
avoid a new trial had the burden of showing that the verdict was not affected by an ex-
tremely serious extraneous intrusion. Id.
21 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). In Sheppard, the Court balanced the
first amendment free press right with the sixth amendment fair trial right, and granted the
petitioner's habeas corpus petition for a new trial. Id. at 363. The Court characterized press
coverage of the murder trial as inflamatory and prejudicial, reasoning that extensive and
unlimited media publicity surrounding the trial caused the jury to consider evidence outside
the courtroom. Id. at 356-57. The Court stated that while freedom of discussion should be
given the widest range compatible with the essential requirement of a fair trial, free discus-
sion should not be allowed to interfere with the calmness and solemnity of the courtroom.
Id. at 350-51. The Sheppard Court included both criminal and civil trials in its discussion of
these competing constitutional considerations. Id.
22 See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (due process challenge successful in
striking Alabama statute permitting those with substantial pecuniary interest in legal pro-
ceedings to sit as judges in such disputes).
2 See text accompanying note 7 supra.
24 See text accompanying note 21 supra.
2 See text accompanying note 20 supra.
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ment which afforded free speech the broadest possible protection,26 the'
Court emphasized in Brandenburg v. Ohio27 that political advocacy must
be directed to producing imminent lawlessness, and be likely to produce
such action, before it could be suppressed.28 This sweeping view of free
political expression, particularly as it relates to insurance company adver-
tising, is supported by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.2 9
Viewed as political expression in the form of paid advertisements, in-
surance company advertisements are in the precise posture of the edito-
26 In a series of dissents which began with the free speech issues growing out of World
War I, Justice Oliver W. Holmes, Jr. managed to eventually convince the majority of the
Court that first amendment protection is extremely broad. In Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919), the defendants were convicted for violating provisions of the Espionage AU
of Congress by printing and distributing circulars which advocated resistance to the draft
and overthrow of the United States government. The majority of the Court affirmed their
convictions, finding that the plain purpose of their propaganda was to incite, during war-
time, diasaffection, riots, and revolution. Id at 623. In dissent, Justice Holmes stated that
Congress could not forbid all effort to change the mind of the country, id. at 628, and that
no intent to cripple or hinder the United States in the prosecution of the war was proved.
Id. at 626. Holmes argued that the free marketplace of ideas is the very theory of our Con-
stitution, stating that the best test of the truth of an idea is to allow that idea to compete
with others, and over the passage of time, either to gain acceptance and belief or to fall
impotent and powerless. Id. at 630.
The defendant in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), was a member of the Left
Wing Section of the Socialist Party and helped author and publish a "Manifesto" which
advocated revolution. He was convicted of criminal anarchy under New York State law. Id.
at 654. The majority viewed such language as "The Communist International calls the prole-
tariat of the world to the final struggle!" as language of direct incitement, and affirmed the
conviction. Id. at 665, 672. Justice Holmes again dissented, stating that every idea is an
incitement, and that ideas manifesting no clear and present danger of unlawful activity
must be given an opportunity for acceptance in the intellectual community. Id. at 673.
Justice Brandeis joined Holmes in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), in
fowarding the view that only an emergency could justify suppression of speech and that
Americans have a duty to make public criticism. The defendant in Whitney was convicted,
as an organizer of the Communist Party in Oakland, California, for violating California's
Criminal Syndicalism Act. Id. at 359, 363. Upholding the conviction, the majority of the
Court reasoned that criminalizing teachings to overthrow the government was within the
legitimate police power of the State. Id. at 371. Concurring, Justice Brandeis, joined by
Justice Holmes, affirmed the conviction under a clear and present danger analysis. Id. at
379. He strenuously urged, however, that only extreme circumstances justify suppression of
speech, and that a healthy democracy depends upon the free expression of unpopular opin-
ions. Id. at 377.
37 395 U.S. 444 (1969)(per curiam).
" Id. at 449. The defendant in Brandenburg was a leader of a Klu Klux Klan group,
and was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute for advocating lawless ac-
tivity. Id. at 444-45. The Court regarded Brandenburg's activites as the mere abstract teach-
ing of resort to violence. Id. at 448. Reversing Brandenburg's conviction, the Court held that
incitement to imminent lawless action, not mere advocacy, was required for the suppression
of speech. Id. at 448-49. On Brandenburg's adoption of developing first amendment theory,
see Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some
Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719, 754-55 (1975).
" 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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rial advertisement protected in the Sullivan case.30 The Sullivan Court
stated that paid advertisements are an important outlet for the promul-
gation of information and ideas by persons who do not themselves have
access to publishing facilities, but who nevertheless wish to exercise their
freedom of speech through the press.$' Moreover, the Sullivan case
stands for the proposition that the first amendment's protection of public
criticism is vital to the functioning of a democratic society.1
2
The political statements embodied in insurance company advertise-
ments also bear the label of corporate speech. Corporate speech contrib-
uting useful information to society received full and unqualified protec-
tion in the Supreme Court's recent decision in First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti.3 3 In Bellotti, the Court struck down a Massachusetts
statute prohibiting corporate speech on issues unrelated to the corpora-
tion's business.3 ' The Bellotti Court stated that the first amendment,
whether applied to individuals, the press, or corporations, does not allow
a limitation of "the stock of information from which members of the pub-
lic may draw."35 If a corporation wishes to contribute information for so-
ciety's edification, the Supreme Court concluded that the first amend-
ment protects such expression."
Even if insurance company advertisements are labeled as purely
"commercial speech, '3 7 they still retain full first amendment protection
31 See id. at 266. Sullivan involved the issue of the extent to which freedom of the
press protects a newspaper against libel actions. Id. at 256. Respondent alleged that he was
libeled by a full-page advertisement, carried in the New York Times, which held respondent
partly responsible for a "wave of terror" in opposition to the civil rights movement. Id. at
256-57. The advertisement also solicited financial contributions for the defense fund of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. Id. The Court stated that, although this speech was in the form of a
paid advertisement and included a solicitation for financial contributions, "[iut communi-
cated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and
sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are mat-
ters of the highest public interest and concern." Id. at 266.
31 Id.
"I See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note On "The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment", 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191 (1964).
-- 435 U.S. 765 (1978). See generally The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, Constitutional
Law, 92 HARV. L. REv. 163 (1978).
" 435 U.S. at 776. Bellotti involved an attempt by banking associations and business
corporations to spend money for the purpose of publicizing their view on a proposed consti-
tutional amendment which was a ballot question at a general election. Id. at 769. The Attor-
ney General of Massachusetts charged the business groups with violating MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN., ch. 55, § 8 (West. Supp. 1977), a statute prohibiting corporate contributions or ex-
penditures for the purpose of affecting the vote on any issue other than one materially af-
fecting the property, business or assets of the corporation. 435 U.S. at 768.
35 435 U.S. at 783.
" Id.
The "commercial speech" label is significant with relation to a series of cases which
suggested that commercial speech is entitled to a lesser degree of first amendment protec-
tion than non-commercial speech. See generally Heller, The End of the "Commercial
Speech" Exception-Good Riddance or More Headaches for the Courts?, 67 Ky. L. J. 927
(1978-79); Roberts, Toward a General Theory of Commercial Speech and the First Amend-
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absent the dissemination of false information.3 8 The Supreme Court's re-
cent decisions in the commercial speech area afford full first amendment
protection to truthful commercial advertising, vindicating the public's
right to make informed decisions on the basis of widely disseminated
commercial information. In Bigelow v. Virginia,9 the Court upheld a
publisher's right to carry advertisements of available abortion services in
a magazine distributed within a university community.40 The Supreme
Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con- -
sumer Council4 similarly allowed for the advertisement of prescription
drug prices so as to allow the public to make well-informed decisions on
the basis of accessible commercial information.42 Public access to the
commercial information contained in "for sale" and "sold" real estate
signs received free speech protection in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Wil-
ment, 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 115 (1979); Comment, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Com-
mercial Speech-Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 24 N.Y.L.S. L. REv.
225 (1978). The Supreme Court initiated the commercial speech doctrine in Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The respondents in Valentine were circulating pamphlets
advertising a submarine tour. Finding they were in violation of New York's antilitter ordi-
nance, respondents printed a political protest on the reverse side of their advertisement. Id.
at 53. The Court recognized this as an attempt to circumvent the ordinance and therefore
implied that the pamphlet was essentially economic in purpose rather than political, and
could be regulated by New York's ordinance prohibiting the distribution of commercial ad-
vertising. Id. at 54-55.
A difference in constitutional protection for commercial as opposed to non-commercial
speech was reiterated in Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). The Court held that a
homeowner's right to privacy outweighed whatever freedom of speech entitlements the peti-
tioner derived from the commercial solicitation of magazine subscriptions. Id. at 644. New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), also distinguished between commercial
speech and fully protected political expression. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
" Recent decisions of the Supreme Court indicate no first amendment barrier to the
regulation and control of false or misleading speech; see text accompanying notes 50-55
infra.
39 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
40 Id. at 819-22. Bigelow involved a Charlottesville publication, the Virginia Weekly,
distributed predominantly to students at the University of Virginia. A New York City or-
ganization, offering persons desiring an abortion assistance with placement in accredited
hospitals and clinics in New York, where abortion is legal, placed an advertisement in the
Virginia Weekly. Id. at 812. The paper's editor, Bigelow, was convicted and fined $500 for
violating a Virginia statute prohibiting advertisements encouraging abortion. Id. at 811. The
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction, specifically relying on the commercial
speech exception to first amendment protection. Id. at 813. The United States Supreme
Court reversed, according full first amendment protection to the abortion services advertise-
ments since they contained information concerned with an issue of interest to the general
public. Id. at 819-22.
41 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
42 Id. at 765. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, plaintiffs challenged a Virginia
statute prohibiting pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices. Although the
Court acknowledged the unquestionable commercial character of the speech, id. at 761, 765,
the first amendment was held to protect public access to the drug price information. Id. at
765.
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lingboro,'s and Bates v. State Bar of Arizona44 granted first amendment
protection to truthful advertisements concerning the availability and
prices of routine legal services.
4 5
The Supreme Court's commercial speech decisions indicate that insur-
ance company advertisements, to the extent that they communicate
truthful commercial information to the public, are protected by the first
amendment. Insurance company advertisements have been attacked,
however, as deceptive and inaccurate for a number of reasons.46 Certain
tort recovery incidents depicted in some of the advertisements are either
unsubstantiated or completely fictitious. 47 The omission of material facts
and mitigating circumstances also lessens the veracity of the advertise-
ments' content.48 Inaccurate statistics on the number of tort suits filed
each year create the impression that a crisis situation exists in the tort
recovery area.49 Proof of false information in insurance company adver-
tisements raises the issue of first amendment protection of false informa-
tion and the possibility of action by the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC).
Although the Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy allowed ad-
vertisements listing prescription drug prices,50 the majority stated that
commercial speech, whether wholly false or only deceptive and mislead-
ing, lies outside the protection of the first amendment.5 1 In Friedman v.
Rogers,5 2 the Court upheld a Texas statute prohibiting optometrists from
using a trade name in connection with their business. 53 The Court found
43 431 U.S. 85, 97-98 (1977). Linmark Associates, Inc. involved the commercial speech
inherent within "for sale" and "sold" signs displayed on real estate. The Town of Wil-
lingboro was experiencing a "white scare" from the community. To curb the growing num-
ber of white families selling their homes, and to promote and preserve a more racially inte-
grated community, the town passed an ordinance prohibiting "for sale" and "sold" signs
from being publicly displayed on all real estate except model homes. Id. at 86-87. The Su-
preme Court struck down the ordinance, upholding the realtor's first amendment right to
communicate information to the public. Id. at 97-98.
44 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
45 Id. at 384.
4' See Kronzer, supra note 9, at 409-10.
41 Id. Incidents recounting substantial damage recoveries by tort victims who used a
lawnmower as a hedgeclipper and who swallowed a safety pin are unsubstantiated by any
actual case. Id.
48 Id. An Aetna advertisement describing the substantial damage recovery claimed by a
truck driver "without brake lights" failed to disclose facts about the driver's actual injuries,
or the fact that the litigants eventually settled the case for a figure lower than that indi-
cated. Id. at 410 n.55.
" Id. at 410. Many of the advertisements repeatedly state that over one million product
liability suits are filed each year. The Insurance Service Office, however, places the figure at
140,000 for 1977. Id.
ao See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra.
81 425 U.S. at 771-72. The Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy stated that the
first amendment does not prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial
information flow cleanly as well as freely. Id.
52 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
3 Id. at 19.
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that trade names can be deceptively associated with price and quality in-
formation, thus manipulating the public into misleading impressions.5
Consequently, the Court determined that restrictions imposed, on false,
deceptive and misleading commercial speech were entirely permissible.
55
False and misleading advertising is subject to regulation by the FTC.
The FTC is authorized to prevent any unfair or deceptive act or practice
in or affecting interstate commerce.5 8 The Commission determines find-
ings of fact and, if supported by evidence, these fingings are con'lusive
upon review in the United States Courts of Appeals.57-Legal determina-
tions that certain advertising is deceptive, however, and appropriate rem-
edies are circumscribed by the Supreme Court's recent decisions in the
commercial speech area.58 An FTC challenge to insurance company ad-
vertising would involve the Commission's own administrative determina-
tion of facts relating to falsity and deception, the same determination
which governs substantive constitutional law interpreting the first amend-
ment as articulated by the Supreme Court. Thus, an FTC decision that
an advertisement is unfair or deceptive is, in effect, a constitutional de-
termination that the advertisement has no first amendment protection.
The propriety of an administrative agency making constitutional deci-
sions remains an open issue.
59
Insurance industry advertising can thus gain first amendment protec-
tion if it is viewed as political, corporate, or, absent falsity and deception,
commercial speech. Once first amendment protection attaches to the in-
surance company advertisements, the doctrine of prior restraint weighs
heavily on the side of insulating the insurance company advertisements
from competing considerations. Prior restraint means the suppression of a
publication before it is published. The doctrine embraces the concept
that freedom of speech and of the press principally means immunity from
prior restraints or. censorship.60 The Supreme Court has championed this
Id. at 12-13.
55 Id. at 9.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976).
57 Id. § 45(c) (1976); Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 616-17 (3d Cir. 1976)(ten-
dency of advertising to deceive established by substantial evidence as whole).
58 See text accompanying notes 39-45, 51-55 supra; Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562
F.2d 749, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (FTC has special responsibility to order corrective advertising
so as not to trench on first amendment rights); National Comm. on Egg Nutrition v. FTC,
570 F.2d 157, 164 (7th Cir. 1977)(first amendment does not permit remedy broader than
that which is necessary to prevent deception).
59 See Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 620 (3d Cir. 1976)(Commission's broad
construction of § 5 authority cannot survive demise of commercial speech exception to first
amendment). See generally Reich, Consumer Protection and the First Amendment: A Di-
lemma for the FTC? 61 MINN. L. REv. 705 (1977).
" See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). The Near Court invalidated a Min-
nesota statute which allowed courts to enjoin the publication of "malicious, scandalous and
defamatory" newspapers. At the core of the Court's argument was the proposition that mali-
cious and scandalous publications are punishable under the laws of libel and slander. Id. at
713-14. Every newspaper publisher accepts the consequence of what he prints, after publica-
1980] 1183
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idea by holding that any system of prior restraints of expression bears a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. 1 This burden re-
sulted in the prohibition of an injunction restraining the peaceful distri-
bution of pamphlets and leaflets, no matter how offensive, which publicly
criticized an individual's business practices.6 2 When the United States
sought to enjoin the New York Times and The Washington Post from
publishing "The Pentagon Papers," the heavy presumption against the
constitutional validity of prior restraints caused the Court to disallow the
injunction. 3
The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the doctrine of
prior restraint arose in the fair trail-free press setting. Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart" involved a sensational murder in a small, rural
Nebraska community.65 The crime immediately attracted massive news
media coverage,e6 and the trial court entered an order restraining the
publication or broadcasting of accounts concerning the confessions or ad-
missions made by the accused, or facts strongly implicating the accused.
6 7
Although the Court acknowledged that pervasive pretrial publicity
threatened the defendant's right to a fair trial,6 a previous restraint on
first amendment freedoms could not be tolerated.6 9 The Court stated that
prior restraints on speech and publications are the most serious and the
least tolerable infringement on first amendment rights.70 The Court sug-
gested change of trial venue, postponement of the trial, searching voir
dire examination of prospective jurors, the use of emphatic and clear jury
tion. Id. at 714. Previous restraints upon publication, however, are the very essence of cen-
sorship, and are inconsistent with our own experience as a nation and the concept of the
first amendment. Id. at 717.
81 See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
82 See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 420 (1971). The respon-
dent in Keefe was a real estate broker in the Austin neighborhood of Chicago. Petitioner
was a racially integrated community organization in the same neighborhood. Id. at 415-16.
The petitioner distributed leaflets and pamphlets criticizing respondent's real estate prac-
tices in a shopping center and among the respondent's fellow-parishoners and neighbors. Id.
at 417. Denying an injunction of petitioner's activities, the Court recognized peaceful pam-
phleteering as a form of communication protected by the first amendment. Id. at 419.
83 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971)(per curiam).
- 427 U.S. 539 (1976). See generally Symposium, Nebraska Press Association v. Stu-
art, 29 STAN. L. REv. 383 (1977).
85 427 U.S. at 542-43. Six members of one family were found murdered in their home in
Sutherland, Nebraska, a town of approximately 850 people. Id. at 542. The charges against
the defendant, amended to reflect the autopsy report, stated that the defendant committed
the murders in the course of a sexual assault. Id. at 543.
66 Id. at 542.
67 Id. at 541.
Id. at 562-63. In reviewing the pretrial record, the Court stated that the trial judge
was justified in concluding that there would be intense and pervasive pretrial publicity con-
cerning the case, and that such publicity might impair the defendant's right to a fair trial.
Id.
69 Id. at 570.
70 Id. at 559.
[Vol. XXXVII
ADVERTISING AND JURY AWARDS
instructions, and sequestration of the jury as alternatives to prior re-
straint in a trial court's effort to protect the defendant's fair trial right.71
The constitutional dilemma posed by insurance company advertising
thus appears in bold relief. First amendment protection of insurance com-
pany advertisements stands in opposition to the civil litigant's right to a
fair trial.7 2 The judicial response to insurance company advertising has
been a liberal view toward protecting the fair trial right through voir dire
examination. Ardently preserving the insurance industry's right to free
speech, courts have rejected the remedy of injunctive relief to prevent
publication.
A fair trial presupposes an impartial, indifferent jury.7" Voir dire ex-
amination, the questioning of prospective jurors about their biases and
prejudices,74 is the principal device used to secure an impartial jury.
7 5
The proper scope of voir dire inquiry, however, has been a continual
problem in civil litigation involving insurance companies.76 Traditionally,
the presence or absence of insurance has been considered irrelevant in
tort suits because the legal and factual determinations concern the duties
and behavior of individual parties." Since knowledge of insurance cover-
age may influence a jury's determination of liability and damages, some
courts view the unnecessary injection of the subject into the trial as prej-
udicial error requiring a new trial.78 An opposing view is that practically
all jurors have automobile insurance themselves, and the rule against
mentioning insurance in a trial assumes an unwarranted naievete on the
part of the jury.7 9 A moderate approach suggests retention of the tradi-
tional rule, with the determination of whether a mistrial is necessary be-
ing made on a case-by-case basis.8 0
In King v. Westlake,"1 the defendant on appeal questioned the propri-
71 Id. at 563-64.
72 See text accompanying notes 15-22, 26-45 supra.
73 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
74 See FEn. R. Cirv. P. 47. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, voir dire exami-
nation may be conducted by the parties or their attorneys, or by the court itself. Id.
75 See generally Gaba, Voir Dire of Jurors: Constitutional Limits to the Right of In-
quiry Into Prejudice, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 525 (1977); Note, Exploring Racial Prejudice On
Voir Dire: Constitutional Requirements And Policy Considerations, 54 B.U. L. REV. 394
(1974).
76 See generally Hatchell, Insurance Advertising-Much Ado About Nothing, 10 ST.
MARY's L. J. 427, 428-39 (1979); Kronzer, supra note 9, at 401-07, 416-22.
7 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS (1977) § 920A & § 925 comment h.
78 See, e.g., Chavin v. Cope, 243 A.2d 694, 696-97 (Del. 1968)(juror's knowledge of in-
surance coverage held to be prejudicial to defendant); Johnson v. Hansen, 237 Or. 1, 389
P.2d 330, 331 (1964)(insurance coverage is irrelevant and unnecessary injection of subject
into trial is prejudicial).
79 See Causey v. Cornelius, 164 Cal. App.2d 269, 275-77, 330 P.2d 468, 473 (1958)(rule
that knowledge of insurance coverage will lead to excessive verdicts is unrealistic and no
longer justified).
80 See Muelebach v. Mercer Mortuary & Chapel, Inc., 93 Ariz. 60, 378 P.2d 741, 744
(1963)(mere mention of the word "insurance" will not always require mistrial).
-1 - Ark. -, 572 S.W.2d 841 (1978).
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ety of plaintiff's voir dire inquiry into whether prospective jurors had lia-
bility insurance, and whether they believed that the size of jury verdicts
in personal injury cases affects automobile liability insurance premiums.
8 2
Prior to the trial, insurance company advertisements appeared in a news-
paper and several periodicals.8 3 All but two of the jurors admitted seeing
one or more of the advertisements."
The King court held that voir dire of the jury was apparently in good
faith and was proper.8 5 Relying on a previous ruling,86 the Supreme Court
of Arkansas held that voir dire examination of prospective jurors respect-
ing their interest in or connection with liability insurance companies is
permissible if counsel is making a good faith effort to ascertain whether
there is ground for challenge of a juror for cause, or for a peremptory
challenge.87 Since the defendant could not demonstrate that plaintiff-
counsel's questions on the effect of insurance company advertisements in-
evitably indicated to jurors that the defendant was insured,88 the court
affirmed the judgment."9
Borkoski v. Yost" also involved the permissible limits of voir dire ex-
amination with respect to insurance company advertising. In a medical
malpractice and wrongful death action,91 plaintiff-appellant Borkoski was
denied permission to examine prospective jurors on the influence of a na-
tional campaign by leading insurance companies with regard to jury
awards.8 2 Borkoski argued that disallowance of this voir dire inquiry
82 Id. at 842. The plaintiff-appellee, Harry Westlake, obtained a $15,000 judgment in an
action arising out of a rear-end automobile collision. Defendant-appellant Wanda King had
only $10,000 of liability insurance and consequently appealed. Id.
83 Id. at 843-44.
Id. at 844.
85 Id.. On voir dire, plaintiff's counsel explained that it was improper for either side to
imply or suggest that the defendant does or does not have insurance. He explained that his
questions concerned insurance premiums, not insurance. Id. The jury responded affirma-
tively to the question of whether jury verdicts affect insurance premiums. When asked if
they could put aside the knowledge that whatever verdict they rendered might affect their
own financial interest, so that a fair verdict would be returned, all jurors responded in the
affirmative. Id.
8 Dedmond v. Thalheimer, 226 Ark. 402, 290 S.W.2d 16 (1956)(purpose of voir dire is
to ascertain possible grounds for challenge, and good faith inquiries respecting potential
juror's interest in or connection with liability insurance companies allowable).
87 572 S.W.2d at 844.
" Id.
I d.
594 P.2d 688 (Mont. 1979).
* Id. at 689. Defendants in the original malpractice and wrongful death action were St.
Patrick's Hospital and doctors Yost and Gouax. Dr. Gouax carried his malpractice insurance
with Aetna Life & Casualty Company, a participant in the insuance industry advertising
campaign conducted during the time of the 1977 trial. Plaintiff Borkoski settled with St.
Patrick's Hospital for $90,000 prior to trial. Id.
9 Id. at 690. According to an affidavit filed by the attorney for defendant-doctors Yost
and Gouax, Borkoski did inquire as to whether each juror felt any prejudice against this
type of case, and whether the determination would be affected by any articles or advertise-
ments about this type of case. Id. at 690.
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abridged his right to a fair trial."3
On appeal, the Borkoski court considered the conflicting authority on
the proper scope of voir dire questioning concerning insurance and insur-
ance companies," and ultimately adopted the reasoning of King v. West-
lake.9 By presenting evidence that institutional advertising at the time of
trial was calculated to bias jurors against granting large damage awards to
personal injury plaintiffs, the court reasoned that Borkoski should have
been permitted a line of inquiry desiigned to uncover this possible bias."
Mindful of the equal responsibility to protect the defendant's fair trial
right, the court set out guidelines for conducting such voir dire examina-
tion.97 Before proceeding with questions directly related to a potential ju-
ror's possible prejudice arising from insurance company advertisements
discrediting excessive jury verdicts, an attorney must first ask whether a
prospective juror has heard about or might regularly come into contact
with these advertisements. 98 A negative response requires abandonment
of the insurance advertising line of questioning.99
Underlying the holding in Borkoski was the court's belief that the in-
surance company advertisements had a decided impact on potential ju-
rors.10 0 The court reasoned that the insurance indu6try's massive adver-
tising campaign threatened every plaintiff's right to an impartial jury,101
and viewed its liberal interpretation of the proper scope of voir dire ex-
93 Id.
See Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 782-83 (3d Cir. 1965)(voir dire inquiry as
to prospective jurors' possible belief that high jury awards result in larger insurance premi-
ums constitutes reversible error); Fowler v. Burks, 52 Ala. App. 14, 288 So.2d 798, 799
(1974); Kath v. Brodie, 132 Colo. 338, 287 P.2d 957, 958 (1955); Hoston v. Highwater, 111
Ga. App. 87, 140 S.E.2d 525, 526 (1965); Barrett v. Morris, 495 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Mo. App.
1973)(inquiry as to whether prospective jurors have financial interest or connection with
insurance business as stockholders or employees, and whether they are insurance policy-
holders in a particular company is permissible); Barton v. Owen, 71 Cal. App.3d 484, 508,
139 Cal. Rptr. 494, 508 (1977); Murrell v. Spillman, 442 S.W.2d 590, 591 (Ky. 1969); Butcher
v. Main, 426 S.W.2d 356, 360 (Mo. 1968); Maness v. Bullins, 19 N.C. App. 386, 198 S.E.2d
752, 753 (1973); Brockett v. Tice, 445 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
"572 S.W.2d 841 (Ark. 1978); see text accompanying notes 82-89 supra.




100 Id. at 690. The court cited a study on the impact of insurance company advertise-
ments on potential jurors. Loftus, supra note 6 at 69-70. The researchers based the study on
an experiment in which the subjects, during the course of two one-hour sessions, were ex-
posed to various reading material including advertisements. Half of the subjects had an
insurance company advertisement included in their materials and half did not. After the
two sessions were over, all the participants in the experiment were asked to act as jurors and
assess damages in a hypothetical automobile injury case. Dramatically, those subjects which
were exposed to a single insurance company advertisement gave a lower average jury award
than those who had not been exposed to the advertisements. Id.
101 594 P.2d at 694. The court stated that insurance company advertisements
threatened the right to a fair trial by injecting the issue of insurance into the consciousness
of every potential jury. Id.; see text accompanying notes 74-78 supra.
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amination as a necessary prophylactic measure for protecting the fair trial
right.10 2 Ironically, Borkoski's arguments, accepted by the court, failed to
win him a new trial.103 The court reasoned that insurance advertisements
speak only to damages, not liability, and since the jury found defendants
not liable, any errors commited regarding the influence of the advertise-
ments on the trial were harmless and not grounds for reversal.0
The plaintiff sought to enjoin insurance company advertising in Rut-
ledge v. The Liability Insurance Industry.20 5 An attorney who regularly
represented personal injury clients sued, on his own behalf,108 the entire
class of insurance companies who participated in the most recent adver-
tising campaign.20 7 Rutledge sought to njoin publication of certain insur-
ance industry advertisements on the grounds that an attempt by the in-
surance companies to improperly influence jurors to award lower amounts
in damages encourages jurors to consider impermissible facts and, there-
fore, prevents a fair trial.108 On alternative motions for dismissal or sum-
mary judgment,109 the defendant insurance companies argued that an in-
junction against publication of the advertisements would constitute an
unconstitutional prior restraint on their freedom of speech. 10
The propriety of enjoining insurance company advertising in Rutledge
rested on the competing constitutional considerations of first amendment
protection of free speech"1 1 and the right to a fair trial.11 2 Although the
insurance company advertisements had a "commercial aspect,"'1 3 the
102 594 P.2d at 694; see text accompanying notes 11-23 supra.
103 594 P.2d at 695.
104 Id.
101 No. 78-1506 (E.D. La. 1979).
106 The Rutledge court did not address the issue of a personal injury lawyer's standing
to sue the liability insurance industry. Federal courts, however, have repeatedly allowed
third parties to sue on behalf of the constitutional rights of others. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soci-
ety of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 513-14 (1925)(though constitutional rights involved were those
of children and their parents, parochial school allowed to attack statute requiring public
education for all children); Brewer v. Hoxie School District No. 46, 238 F.2d 91, 104-05
(1956)(school board allowed to obtain injunction barring conduct that would have interfered
with the right of school children to be free from segregation).
107 No. 78-1506, slip op. at 5 (E.D. La. 1979). Plaintiff named the liability insurance
industry as defendant. This class was represented by The Travelers Insurance Company, St.
Paul Companies, Inc., Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, Employers Insurance of Wausau
and Crum & Forster. Id. Advertisements by Employers Insurance of Wausau and Crum &
Forster, directed to businessmen and urging legislative reform, did not fall in the category of
advertisements attacked by plaintiff. Id. at 7-8. The motions by Employers Insurance of
Wausau and Crum & Forster for summary judgment therefore were granted. Id.
:0 Id. at 5.
1 Id. All five class representatives sought dismissal under FED. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) or,
alternatively, summary judgment. Id.
:10 Id.; see text accompanying notes 60-71 supra.
11 Id. at 8; see text accompanying notes 26-45 supra.
112 Id.; see text accompanying notes 10-25 supra.
113 Id. The court discerned one factor in the insurance company advertisements which
gave them a commercial aspect. If the advertisements are successful, a reduction in jury
awards would operate to the financial advantage of liability insurance carriers. Id. However,
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Rutledge court concluded that they should not be characterized as "com-
mercial speech."114 Rather, the court viewed the advertisements as politi-
cal statements on matters of public interest "1 5 and fully protected by the
first amendment.116 A prior restraint of first amendment speech carries a
heavy presumption of unconstitutionality, " , and as the advertisements
were not directed to any specific case, their threat to a fair trial was re-
mote and did not justify the extraordinary relief of a prior restraint of
publication.118 The court viewed voir dire, jury instructions and other un-
specified safeguards in the trial process as sufficient to protect future
plaintiffs.
119
A New York federal district court dismissed an action to enjoin publi-
cation of insurance company advertisements in Quinn v. Aetna Life &
Casualty Co.120 Following a state court determination that a cause of ac-
tion for enjoining Aetna's advertisements did exist,"2" the case was re-
moved to federal court. " The federal court ultimately dismissed plain-
the advertisements are not trying to "sell the product" in that no attempt to sell insurance
or recommend a particular type of insurance is made. Id.
", Id. at 8-9. The court acknowledged the fact that insurance company advertisements
reflected commercial and financial interests of the advertiser. However, the court viewed the
advertisements as communicating information about the insurance industry and making
available to the public that industry's opinion on matters of public concern, most specifi-
cally reform of the tort law. Id. at 9; see text accompanying note 6 supra. The court
grounded its conclusion that the insurance company advertisements should not be charac-
terized as "commercial speech" on First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978), Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376'
U.S. 254 (1964). See text accompanying notes 29-36, 39-40 supra.
RI No. 78-1506, slip op. at 9 (E.D. La. 1979).
See text accompanying notes 26-32 supra.
11 See text accompanying notes 60-63 supra.
"' No. 78-1506, slip op. at 10 (E.D. La. 1979). The Supreme Court's recent decision in
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) guided the Rutledge court in its
prior restraint analysis. No. 78-1506, slip op. at 9 (E.D. La. 1979); see text accompanying
notes 64-71 supra.
"' No. 78-1506, slip op. at 10 (E.D. La. 1979).
120 No. 78-1628 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
" See Quinn v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 96 Misc.2d 545, 409 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1978).
Reviewing Supreme Court explications of the commercial speech doctrine, see text accom-
panying notes 37-45, 50-55 supra, the Quinn court concluded that Aetna was engaged in
commercial speech unprotected by the first amendment. 409 N.Y.S.2d at 478. New York's
General Business Law, § 350-A, describes advertising which "fails to reveal facts material in
light of such representation" as misleading, and the court reasoned that the failure of
Aetna's advertisements to indicate that excessive jury awards may be reduced or set aside
made the advertisements misleading. 409 N.Y.S.2d at 478. In striking a balance between
what the court interpreted as unprotected false advertising, id. at 478-79, and the right to a
fair trial, Quinn stated that an injunction against Aetna's advertisements, advertisements
which unduly burden plaintiff's right to a fair trial, may constitutionally lie. Id. at 481.
2 No. 78-1628, slip op. at 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). Quinn's original action, see text accompa-
nying note 121 supra, was against Aetna as well as New York Magazine and Newsweek,
carriers of Aetna's advertisements. Following the state court decision, Quinn consented to
an order severing the claims against Aetna from those against New York Magazine and
Newsweek. Complete diversity then existed between plaintiff Quinn and defendant Aetna
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tiff's claim for injunctive relief as a constitutionally impermissible prior
restraint of speech.
12
The Quinn court viewed Aetna's advertisements as fully protected po-
litical expression rather than falling within the unprotected category of
false and deceptive speech.12' Political expression in the form of a paid
advertisement 125 made by a corporation 126 does not lose its first amend-
ment protection. 27 The Quinn court held that injunctive relief prohibit-
ing further publication of Aetna's advertisements was not justified by the
considerations necessary to overcome the strong constitutional presump-
tion against a prior restraint of speech.
128
These recent cases indicate that insurance company advertising aimed
at lessening high damage awards continues virtually unabated. Rutledge
and Quinn spotlight the constitutional tightrope between fair trial and
free speech rights and the precarious position of prior restraints of publi-
cation in this area.129 Liberal voir dire, as exemplified by King and
Borkoski,30 represents the trial lawyer's most effective tool against the
effect of insurance company advertising on the plaintiff's right to a fair
trial.
Institutional advertising by the insurance industry presents a unique
challenge to the personal injury lawyer's craft. In our complex society of
widely disseminated information, insurance company efforts to influence
the public about the economics of high jury awards may seriously under-
cut the amount of damages future juries are willing to return. The fair
trial rights of deserving plaintiffs may well be jeopardized. As first
amendments speakers, however, the insurance companies enjoy an almost
unqualified right to express their opinions. False or deceptive information
contained within insurance advertisements can vitiate that right. Lawyers
take on a seemingly undefeatible champion, however, when they seek the
remedy of injunctive relief through restraints on protected first amend-
ment speech. Against this backdrop, liberal voir dire examination serves
as the best device for aiding the courts in their dual role of assuring a fair
Life & Casualty Company. The case was removed to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1441 and 1446(b). No. 78-1628, slip op. at 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
I" No. 78-1628, slip op. at 5 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
2 Id.; see text accompanying notes 50-55 supra.
" No. 78-1628, slip op. at 5 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 50-51
(1976)(regulation of political advocacy through newspaper advertising held unconstitu-
tional); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964)(fact that advertise-
ment constituting political eipression was paid for is totally irrelevant to first amendment
protection).
12 No. 78-1628, slip op. at 5 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); see First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 764, 777 (1978); text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
12 No. 78-1628, slip op. at 5 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
128 Id. The Quinn court grounded its prior restraint argument on Nebraska Press Asso-
ciation v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). See text accompanying notes 64-71 supra.
M' See text accompanying notes 23-25, 26-45, 60-71 supra.
130 See text accompanying notes 79-103 supra.
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trial and protecting the insurance industry's right to free speech.
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